A fundamental question that has been studied in cryptography and in information theory is whether two parties can communicate confidentially using exclusively an open channel. We consider the model in which the two parties hold inputs that are correlated in a certain sense. This model has been studied extensively in information theory, and communication protocols have been designed which exploit the correlation to extract from the inputs a shared secret key. However, all the existing protocols are not universal in the sense that they require that the two parties also know some attributes of the correlation. In other words, they require that each party knows something about the other party's input. We present a protocol that does not require any prior additional information. It uses spacebounded Kolmogorov complexity to measure correlation and it allows the two legal parties to obtain a common key that looks random to an eavesdropper that observes the communication and is restricted to use a bounded amount of space for the attack. Thus the protocol achieves complexity-theoretical security, but it does not use any unproven result from computational complexity. On the negative side, the protocol is not efficient in the sense that the computation of the two legal parties uses more space than the space allowed to the adversary.
Introduction
The goal of a secret key agreement protocol is to allow two parties that communicate through a public channel to obtain a shared string that is secret in some reasonable sense (e.g., information-theoretical, complexity-theoretical, or some other sense) to anyone that has observed the communication. There are some well-known such protocols, such as the Diffie-Hellman protocol, or various public-key cryptosystems, that are efficient and used in the real world. However, they have the disadvantage of relying on some unproven hardness conjectures in computational complexity. Another setting is to assume that the two parties hold at the beginning of the protocol pieces of information that have a certain degree of correlation. Then, in some circumstances, it is possible to compute the shared secret key without any unproven assumption. For a simple illustration, suppose that Alice holds a line L in the 2-dimensional affine space, and Bob holds a point P which lies on L. Then Alice sends Bob the slope of L, after which Bob, knowing that his P is on L, can compute the intercept of L. Now, both Alice and Bob have the intercept of L, which they can use as a secret key, because the adversary has only seen the slope, which is independent of the intercept.
In this paper, we consider the latter type of secret key agreement protocols. Thus, Alice starts with a string x, Bob starts with y, and, after several rounds of interacting via messages exchanged over a public channel, they obtain at the end of the protocol a common secret key, that is a string z which is random conditioned by the transcript of the protocol. The protocol is probabilistically computable, i.e., there exists a probabilistic algorithm so that Alice computes each of her messages by running the algorithm on her input and on the messages that she has received from Bob so far, and Bob computes his messages similarly. As in the above example, if x and y are correlated in some way, one can hope to use the information that is common to these strings to extract with high probability a secret key.
This scenario has been studied since long in Information Theory and the common flavor of the results is that for many interpretations of "correlated," secret key agreement is possible. Leung [LYC76] , Bennett et al. [BBR88] , Maurer [Mau93] , Ahlswede and Csiszár [AC93] have started an extensive research line dedicated to the case when x and y are generated by a stochastic process, whose properties describe their correlation (see the survey of Narayan and Tyagi [NT16] ). Recently, Romashchenko and Zimand [RZ18] have studied this problem in the very general framework of Algorithmic Information Theory using Kolmogorov complexity to gauge correlation without using any generative model for the provenance of x and y. 1 In all these works, Alice and Bob possess at the beginning of the protocol, in addition to x and y, some information about how these strings are correlated. For instance, in the above example, Bob knows that the point P is on the line L. In the scenarios based on generative models, Alice and Bob know various attributes of the joint distribution of the two random variables (X, Y ) which describe the stochastic process that generates the pair (x, y), such as entropy, ergodic properties, etc. In the algorithmic information theory setting used in [RZ18] , Alice and Bob know the complexity profile of (x, y), which is the 3-tuple (C(x), C(y), C(x, y)), where C(·) denotes Kolmogorov complexity. (Throughout this paper, C(x), called the Kolmogorov complexity of x or the minimal description length of x, is the length of a shortest program that when executed by a universal Turing machine prints x.)
Can Alice and Bob agree on a secret key without any additional prior information? A disclaimer: This is not really a problem relevant for cryptography, because the protocols are not efficient. We rather view it as a question about the fundamental limits of information processing and communication. The challenge is that Alice and Bob have to detect a type of correlation of their inputs through rounds of communication without leaking too much information to the eavesdropper, so that they can compute a shared secret key of reasonable length.
What is a reasonable length of the secret key? The relevant parameter that comes into play is the mutual information of x and y, denoted I(x : y), which intuitively represents the amount of information that is shared by x and y. In case we use Kolmogorov complexity to measure the amount of information, I(x : y) is defined as C(x)+C(y)−C(x, y), and, up to logarithmic precision, is also equal to C(x)−C(x | y) and to C(y) − C(y | x). It is shown in [RZ18] (extending a classical result from [AC93] which is valid for inputs generated by memoryless processes, and which is using Shannon entropy to measure information), that no computable protocol (even probabilistic) can obtain a shared secret key longer than the mutual information of the inputs x and y. On the other hand, a protocol is presented in [RZ18] that with high probability produces a shared secret of length I(x : y) (up to logarithmic precison), provided, as mentioned above, the two parties know the complexity profile of the inputs. Thus, the above discussion suggests that it is natural to aim for a shared secret key whose length is equal to the mutual information of the inputs, for some concept of information that measures the detectable correlation.
Our contribution. We identify space-bounded Kolmogorov complexity as a concept of information that allows secret key agreement without any prior information or special setup (e.g., shared randomness, special extra channel) between the two parties. The space-bounded Kolmogorov complexity with space bound S of a string x, denoted C S (x), is similar to standard Kolomogorov complexity except that the universal Turing machine is restricted to use at most S cells on the working tape (see Section 1.1 for the formal definition). We show that the correlation induced by space-bounded Kolmogorov can be determined without revealing much about x and y, which, in turn, allows the parties to compute a common secret key.
The protocols that we design produce a key z that is random given the transcript in the sense of space-bounded Kolmogorov complexity, where the transcript is the set of messages sent by Alice and Bob. Formally, we require that C S (z | transcript) is close to the length of z (denoted |z|), for some space bound S. In other words, an eavesdropper which is bounded to use space S and knows the transcript, needs essentially |z| bits to find the secret key z, which is the same as if she did not know the transcript. If C S (z | transcript) ≥ |z| − ∆, we say that ∆ is the randomness deficiency of z with respect to the transcript, and thus we want to obtain z with small randomness deficiency. We also want the length of z to be close to the mutual information of x and y, which in the case of space-bounded Kolmogorov complexity is defined as C S1 (x) − C S2 (x | y) for space bounds S 1 and S 2 . We next present our results.
We recall that a function S(n) is fully-space constructible if there is a Turing machine M that uses exactly S(n) cells for every natural number n and for every input of length n. Theorem 1.1 Let S be any fully space constructible function.such that S(n) ≥ n.
There is a randomized protocol that allows Alice on input x (an n-bit string) and Bob on input y (of arbitrary length) to obtain with probability (1 − ǫ) a common string z such that 3 , λ 4 are constants that depend only on the universal Turing machine, and ≥ + hides a loss of precision bounded by O(log(n/ǫ)).
Note: The notation a ≥ + b means that a ≥ b − α, where α is the specified loss of precision. The communication complexity of the protocol in the above theorem is n 2 +O(n log(1/ǫ))+C S(n) (x | y), which is very large. The protocol in [RZ18] (in which the parties also hold the complexity profile of (x, y)) has communication complexity roughly C(x | y), which is shown to be optimal. Thus, in our case, it would be desirable to have a protocol with communication complexity close to C S(n) (x | y). The protocol in the next theorem has this property.
fixed polynomial that only depends on the universal Turing machine.
There is a randomized protocol that allows Alice on input x (an n-bit string) and Bob on input y (of arbitrary length) to obtain with probability (1 − ǫ) a common string z such that
, λ is a constant that depends only on the universal Turing machine, and ≥ + hides a loss of precision bounded by O(log 3 (n/ǫ)). Furthemore, the length of the transcript is bounded by C S(n) (x | y) + O(log 3 (n/ǫ)).
In the above theorems, the key z has ∆, the randomness deficiency conditioned by the transcript, bounded by C S ′ (n) (x) − C S ′′ (n) (x), where S ′ and S ′′ differ by a multiplicative constant. Thus, intuitively, ∆ is small. A particularly favorable case is when x is a shallow string. A string x is S-shallow if C S(n) (x) = + C(x), i.e., if S(n) is enough space to allow the construction of x from a description which is close to a shortest description. For every space bound S, most strings are S-shallow and in case x is such a string then ∆ = + 0.
Prerequisites
The S-space bounded Kolmogorov complexity of x conditioned by y with respect to a Turing machine M ,
In the case of space-bounded Kolmogorov complexity, simulation by the universal machine incurs a constant blow-up in space usage. More precisely, there exists a universal Turing machine U and a constant γ > 1 such that for any space bound S, for any Turing machine M and for all strings x, y,
As usual, we fix a universal machine U , and denote more simply C S (·) instead of C S U (·). Also, in case the string y used in the condition is the empty string, we drop the condition in the notation.
The chain rules for space-bounded Kolmogorov complexity are as follows: There exists a constant γ > 1 such that for any space bound S, it holds that:
(1)
To simplify the writing of expressions, we sometimes use the notation
, where S is a space bound and γ (or sometimes λ) is a constant which is clearly defined in the context. For instance, the last inequality will be written as
Outline of the proofs
The proofs of both Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 have the same structure. We present an outline, in which, for simplicity, we skip some technical details and ignore small factors in the quantitative relations.
Recall that initially Alice holds x and Bob holds y. The protocols in both proofs have two phases: (1) Information reconciliation, in which Alice communicates x to Bob by sending him just enough information that allows him to obtain x given his y, and (2) Secret key construction, in which, separately, Alice and Bob compute the secret key z. All the communication happens in the Information reconciliation phase.
Phase 1 (Information reconciliation): First, Alice and Bob agree on a space bound S = S(n). Next, Alice sends Bob a randomized hash function h. The goal is for Alice to send Bob, as a fingerprint, some prefix of h(x) that permits Bob to construct Alice's string x using the fingerprint and his string y. To avoid sending more information than what Bob needs, Alice sends the bits of h(x) sequentially one bit per round. At each round, Bob attempts to construct x by checking if the fingerprint of some string in a set of possible candidates matches the prefix of h(x) that he has received so far. More precisely, at each round j, the candidates are those strings whose S-space-bounded complexity conditioned by y is at most j. If Bob finds a string among these candidates with a fingerprint that matches the prefix of h(x) sent so far by Alice, he believes that he has found x, tells Alice to stop sending further bits by sending her '1', and Phase 1 stops. Otherwise, he tells Alice that he needs more bits by sending her '0' (in which case Alice sends in the next round the next bit of h(x)).
Let p be the prefix of h(x) that Alice sends to Bob during the entire Phase 1. Then, with high probability, at the end of Phase 1, 1. Bob has x, 2. |p| ≤ C S (x | y), because we show that Bob can reconstruct x by round j = C S (x | y). In the proof of Theorem 1.1, a random matrix H also appears in the condition (as we explain below), but this has little impact, because H is a random.
Phase 2 (Secret key construction): After Phase 1, both Alice and Bob have x (with high probability). They both compute the shared secret key z by exhaustive searching a minimal length program of x given p in space S. So, from p and z, it is possible to construct x. It follows that z and p are independent, because otherwise z would not be minimal. But then z and the transcript of the protocol are also almost independent, because the transcript consists of p and the sequence '0 . . . 01' sent by Bob, and the complexity of 0 . . . 01 is low (at most log n + O(1)). Thus, z is a secret key. Let us now estimate the length of z. Since x can be constructed from p and z in space S, it follows that C S (x) ≤ |p| + |z|, and thus the length of z is at least C S (x) − |p|, which, by the above bound of |p|, is at least C S (x) − C S (x | y), which is the mutual information of x and y in the framework of space-bounded Kolmogorov complexity.
The main technical issue is finding the hash function that is used in Phase 1. In the proof of Theorem 1.1, this is just a random linear function given by a random matrix H, chosen by Alice. H is roughly n 2 bits long, and Alice needs to also send H to Bob. This is the reason the communication complexity is large. Also, the information-theoretical considerations in Phase 2, are somewhat more delicate, because we need to take into account H. To reduce the communication complexity, one has to use a shorter hash function.
One idea is to use Newman's theorem from communication complexity, in which H is chosen from a smaller sample space. But the sample space needs to be effectively constructed, and the obvious way to do this leads to a loss of precision that is logaritmic in both the length of x and of y, which can be very damaging in case y is much longer than x. In Theorem 1.2, we use for hashing an explicit extractor of Raz, Reingold, and Vadhan [RRV02] , which has the special property that if we take prefixes of the output, the extractor property is preserved. These type of extractors, called prefix extractors, allow much more communicationefficient hashing, in the sense that Alice does not need to send the hashing function to Bob, at the cost of making Bob's reconstruction of x more complicated.
In our technical approach, we were inspired by several papers. Prefix extractors have been used for information reconciliation in [MRS11] and [Zim17] , and the first paper analyzes the case of space-bounded Kolmogorov complexity. The application to secret-key agreement is a novel contribution of this paper. Some of the information-theoretical estimations are similar to those in [RZ18] . The idea of sending pieces of a fingerprint in several rounds for the problem of information reconciliation (similarly to our Phase 1) has been used before in [BR11, Koz18] , and, the closest to our approach, in [BKV08] , where they study the communication complexity of this problem in terms of the Kolmogorov complexity of the two inputs. There is however a significant difference with the information reconcilation phase in our main result, because, as standard in communication complexity, the protocol in [BKV08] is not computable, and therefore they can use random hash functions for fingerprinting.
Proof of Theorem 1.1
Phase 1: Information reconciliation.
Before sending the first message, Alice takes a random matrix H with entries in the finite field GF[2], with (n + log(1/δ)) rows and n columns, where n is the length of x and δ = ǫ/2n. The random matrix H defines a random linear function h mapping n bit strings to n + log(1/δ) bit strings (viewed as vectors over GF[2]), given by the expression h(v) = H · v.
In Round 0, Alice sends to Bob n, H, and the first 1 + log(1/δ) bits of h(x).
Then in each subsequent round, Alice sends to Bob the next bit of h(x) till Bob announces that he does not need any additional bit. Thus, at round j ≥ 1, Bob has received the first (j + 1) + log(1/δ) bits of h(x), a string which we denote p j . Bob checks if there is a string u in B j = {u ∈ {0, 1} n | C S(n) (u | y, H) ≤ j} such that p j is a prefix of h(u). If there is such a string u, he believes that u is x, and announces that he does not need any extra bits and the information reconciliation stops here. If there is no such string u, Bob announces that he needs more bits and the protocol proceeds with the next round.
Bob is wrong at round j, if there is a string u different from x in B j such that the prefixes of length (j + 1) + log(1/δ) of h(u) and h(x) coincide. For an arbitrary string u = x, the probability that h(u) and h(x) agree in the first (j + 1) + log(1/δ) bits is 2 −((j+1)+log(1/δ)) = δ/2 j+1 . Since B j has less than 2 j+1 elements, by the union bound, the probability that Bob is wrong at round j is less than δ.
Let k = C S(n) (x | y, H). Let E be the event that Bob is wrong at one of the rounds 1, . . . , k. E has probability at most kδ ≤ 2nδ = ǫ. Conditioned by E not being true, the protocol reaches round k, when Bob finds x. Thus, with probability 1 − ǫ, at the end of round k, Bob has obtained x, and the string p := p k is a program for x given y and H in space γ ′ · S(n), for some constant γ ′ , and p has length C S(n) (x | y, H).
Phase 2: Key construction. By exhaustive search, Alice and (separately) Bob find z, the first program of x given p and H in space S. We show that z satisfies the conclusion of the theorem.
We denote S := S(n) and we let ≥ + hide a loss of precision of O(log(n/ǫ)). Recall that we use the notation CS (i) (. . . ) in lieu of C λ i ·S (. . . ), where λ is here the maximum between the above γ ′ and γ (the constant from the chain rule (1)).
First, we notice that, with high probability, conditioning by a random H does not decrease complexities by too much. Claim 3.1 For every space bound S, for every n-bit string u, for every string v, if H is chosen uniformly at random independent of u and v, we have
Proof
(2)
In the first two lines, we use the chain rule, and in the last line, we use the fact that, for every i, 
Next we move to part (ii), where we need to show that the complexity of the secret key z, conditioned by the transcript of the protocol, is close to the length of z. The transcript consists of p, H, N (all sent by Alice to Bob) and of Bob's sequence of responses s = 000 . . . 01 of length ℓ = k + 1 + log(1/ǫ). Bob's sequence has complexity bounded by log ℓ + O(1) = O(log(n/ǫ)), and therefore, for every i we have CS (i) (z | s, p, H, n) = + CS (i) (z | p, H). Thus we can ignore s and n in the condition and it is enough to bound from below CS (i) (z | p, H). We show the following estimation, which ends the proof of the theorem.
Proof We need an upper bound of |z|: 
and
(p can be computed from x, H and its length)
Combining inequalities (6) and (5), we obtain
Using inequality (4), we finally obtain
where ∆ = CS (−2) (x) − CS (8) (x). The conclusion follows after rescaling ǫ.
We first present extractors, which have been studied in the theory of pseudorandomness (for example, see [Vad12] ). A particular type of extractor, prefix extractors, is used in the protocol in the proof of Theorem 1.2 for hashing. We recall that a (k, ǫ) extractor is a function E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m with the property that for every subset B ⊆ {0, 1} n of size at least 2 k and for every subset A ⊆ {0, 1} m :
where U B and U d are independent random variables that are uniformly distributed over B and, respectively,
It is useful to view an extractor E as a bipartite graph G, whose set of left nodes is {0, 1} n , the set of right nodes is {0, 1} m , and each left node x has 2 d (not necessarily distinct) right neighbors {E(x, w) | w ∈ {0, 1} d }. The right node E(x, w), for random w ∈ {0, 1} d , is viewed as the random fingerprint of the left node x.
As usual, we use explicit extractors. An explicit extractors is a family of extractors {E n } as above, indexed by n, and with the rest of the parameters k, d, m, ǫ being functions of n, such that there exists an algorithm that computes E n (x, w) in time polynomial in n. Actually, for us it is more important the space complexity of the algorithm that computes the extractor.
We denote D = 2 d , M = 2 m . Let B be a set of left nodes. The average numbers of neighbors in B of a right node (called the average B-degree) is avg = |B| · D/M . We say that a right node p is ǫ-heavy for B if it has more (1/ǫ) · avg left neighbors in B. We say that a left node u ∈ {0, 1} n is ǫ-poor for B if a fraction larger than 2ǫ of its right neighbors are ǫ-heavy for B. Intuitively, a heavy p is a fingerprint that causes many collisions, and u is poor if many of its fingerprints produce many collisions.
The relevant property of extractors is presented in the next lemma. The point is that an ǫ-poor string is difficult to handle because a random fingerprint of it produces many collisions. The lemma gives a criterion which guarantees that a string is not ǫ-poor. Proof Let A be the set of strings that are ǫ-heavy for B. By counting the edges between B and A from left-to-right and from right-to-left, we obtain that |A|/M ≤ ǫ. Let POOR be the set of nodes that are ǫ-poor for B. Note that
It follows that POOR has size less than 2 k−c , because otherwise the set POOR would violate the property that E is a (k − c, ǫ)-extractor. Given y, n, k, c, the set POOR can be enumerated using space S(n) + O(n) (we need the second term to maintain several counters which require O(n) space). Taking into account the additional space needed by the universal machine, it follows that for some constant λ, if u is an ǫ-poor node than
which implies C λS(n) (u | y, n, k − 1) ≤ k − 1, for sufficiently large c. It follows that x is not ǫ-poor, which proves the lemma.
We need to use a prefix extractor, which is a a function E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} n with the property that for every k ≤ n, the function E k obtained by retaining only the prefix of length k of E(x, w) is a (k, ǫ) randomness extractor. Raz, Reingold and Vadhan [RRV02] have obtained an explicit extractor E RRV of this type with d = O(log 3 (n/ǫ)). E RRV (x, w) can be computed in time polynomial in n (recall that n = |x|). Let p 0 (n) be the polynomial that bounds the space used in the computation of E RRV (x, w).
In the protocol, we use the Raz-Reingold-Vadhan prefix extractor E RRV . We denote by E k , the k-prefix of E RRV , and, abusing notation, also the bipartite graph corresponding to the (k, ǫ) extractor E k .
In addition to E RRV , we use a hash function h, based on congruences modulo prime numbers. We view a string x as an integer (in some canonical way) and define h t (x) = (x mod q, q), where q is a prime number chosen at random among the first t prime numbers. The properties of h t follow from the following lemma. 
. , x s be distinct n-bit strings, which we view in some canonical way as integers < 2 n+1 . Let t = (1/ǫ) · s · n. Let q be a prime number chosen uniformly at random among the first t prime numbers. Then, with probability (1 − ǫ),
We now present the protocol. Recall that at the beginning of the protocol, Alice holds an n-bit string x, and Bob holds a string y. We fix the parameters as follows. Let λ and c be the constants guaranteed by Lemma 4.1, let s = (1/ǫ) · 2 c+1 · D, where D = 2 d = 2 O(log 3 (n/ǫ)) is the degree of the E RRV extractor, and let t = (1/ǫ) · s · n. We use the space bound S(n) and the constant λ > 1, given by Lemma 4.1 applied to the E RRV extractor. As we did earlier, we use the abbreviated notation CS (i) (. . .) for C λ i ·S(n) (. . .).
Phase 1: Information reconciliation.
In Round 0, Alice sends to Bob, n and h t (x), where h t is the hash function introduced above. Next, Alice computes p ′ = E RRV (x, w) for a random w ∈ {0, 1} d . Alice sends to Bob the string p ′ (or rather a prefix of it), one bit per round, till Bob announces that he does not need more bits.
Suppose we are at round k, after Alice has sent the k-th bit of p ′ . Thus, by now Bob has received p k , the k-th bit long prefix of p ′ . He calculates, as we explain next, a set of candidate strings, which he thinks might be x. A string x ′ is a candidate at round k if in B. Therefore, conditioned on non E, with probability 1 − 2ǫ, x is a candidate at round k * , and Bob finds it. We conclude that with probability larger than 1 − 3ǫ, Bob correctly obtains x.
Let p be the part of the protocol's transcript that Alice has sent to Bob. For the analysis of Phase 2, we need to evaluate the length of p. The string p consists of n, h t (x) and the prefix of p ′ that Alice has sent bit-by-bit before Bob told her that he does not need any further bits. By the analysis above, with probability 1 − 3ǫ, the length of the prefix of p ′ is at most k * . Let k = C S(n) (x | y). Since
it follows from the definition of k * that k * ≤ k. Next, the length of n and h t (x) is O(log 3 (n/ǫ)) because the t-th largest prime number is less than t log t. We conclude that |p| ≤ + CS (0) (x | y).
(10)
Phase 2: Key construction. Alice and Bob compute by exhaustive search from x and p a program z of x given p in space S(n) of minimal length CS (0) (x | p).
We now show that the protocol satisfies the requirements of Theorem 1.2, and we start with part (i). We let ≥ + hide a loss of precision of O(log 3 (n/ǫ)). We have
(because x is computed from p and z in space S(n))
Next we show part (ii) in Theorem 1.2. First notice that, by the chain rule,
Next,
≥ + CS (1) (x, p) − CS (0) (p) (because x can be computed from z and p in space S(n)) = CS (−1) (x, p) − CS (0) (p) − (CS (−1) (x, p) − CS (1) (x, p))
where ∆ = CS (−1) (x, p) − CS (1) (x, p). Since p can be computed from x and the seed of the extractor and the random prime number q used by h t in space p 0 (n) ≤ S(n), we have
The transcript t of the protocol consists of p and Bob's sequence of responses 00 . . . 01, which has complexity bounded by log n. Therefore
which proves part (ii) of Theorem 1.2.
Final comments
As we have mentioned in the Introduction, the main results are of theoretical, rather than practical, relevance. The secret key agreement protocols in Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 produce a key that looks random to an adversary whose computation is space-bounded by S(n). In both theorems, the two legal parties (i.e., Alice and Bob) execute the protocol in space λS(n), for a constant λ > 1. For this reason, the protocols do not seem to be suitable for real cryptographic applications.
Another observation regards the key length. In Theorem 1.2, the protocol, on inputs the n-bit string x and the string y, runs in space λS(n) (this is the space used by the two parties combined) for some constant λ > 1 and produces a secret key z of length |z| ≈ C S(n) (x) − C S(n) (x | y) and having the randomness deficiency of z conditioned by the trancript as stated in the theorem. Recall that the randomness deficiency ∆ is defined by ∆ = |z| − C S(n) (z | transcript). Is the length of z optimal? It is known from [RZ18] , that no computable protocol can produce a key longer than C(x) − C(x | y), the mutual information of the inputs held by the two parties. We have not been able to obtain a similarly clean result for protocols that run in space S(n). By adapting the arguments in [RZ18] , it can be shown, that if a protocol runs in space S(n) then, for every pair of inputs (x, y) with length bounded by n, it produces a key z with C λ 2 S(n) (z | transcript) ≤ C S(n) (x) − C λ 3 S(n) (x | y), for some constant λ > 1. Thus we obtain the following upper bound: If a secret key agreement protocol runs in space S(n) and on input (x, y), with |x|, |y| ≤ n, it produces a secret key z with randomness deficiency ∆, then |z| ≤ C S(n) (x) − C λ 3 S(n) (x | y) + ∆ + ∆ 1 , where ∆ 1 = C (S(n) (z | transcript) − C λ 2 S(n) (z | transcript) and λ > 1 is a constant, which only depends on the universal machine that defines the complexity.
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